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BOOK REVIEW
A LAWYER LOOKS AT THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT, by Rex E.
Lee. Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 1980, pp. xiii+
141. $18.50.
The proposed Twenty-seventh Amendment to the Constitution,
popularly known as the Equal Rights Amendment ("ERA"), I has
joined its predecessor ERA's in defeat. The failure to ratify by the necessary thirty-eight states marks the end of the most sustained of the
numerous campaigns waged this century for a constitutional guarantee
of equality for women. 2
In the wake of the ERA's demise, Rex Lee's book, A Lawyer Looks
at the Equal Rights Amendment,3 is instructive, not as an academic
postmortem on the Amendment itself, but as a bellwether of the future
prospects for constitutional equality of women in America. Rex Lee is
currently the Solicitor General of the United States. As the chief appellate lawyer for the federal government, Lee occupies a position of
paramount importance in the formulation and enforcement of the Reagan administration's legal policies and positions in the area of civil
rights.4 A distinguished law graduate of the University of Chicago, Lee
was the founding Dean of Brigham Young University's fledgling law
school and served briefly as Chief of the Civil Division of the Justice
Department under President Gerald Ford. He brings to his current job
a reputation as an outspoken opponent of judicial activism, a devout
Mormon, and an articulate adversary of ERA proponents.s Lee's efforts in this last regard have included service on the litigation board of
the business-oriented "public interest" law firm that, during his board
tenure, elected to represent Idaho and Arizona state legislators in their
1. "SECTION 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or by any State on account of sex.
SECTION 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
SECTION 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification." See S.l. Res. 8, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), H.R.l. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971),86 Stat. 1523 (1972), 118 CONGo REC. 9598 (1972).
2. For an in-depth historical discussion, see S. BECKER, THE ORIGINS OF THE EQUAL
RIGHTS AMENDMENT: AMERICAN FEMINISM BETWEEN THE WARS (1981). See also L. KANOWITZ, EQUAL RIGHTS: THE MALE STAKE 61-74, 85-144 (1981).
3. R. LEE, A LAWYER LOOKS AT THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT (1980).
4. Pressman, Rex Lee: Legal Soldier in the Reagan Crusade, III W. L.l. No.4, at 2,2-3
(1982).

5. Id.

[1011]

1012

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 9:1011

judicial challenge to Congress' three-year extension of the time period
within which states could have ratified the ERA.6
The early chapters of Lee's book present a relatively dispassionate
historical analysis of the legal status of women in the United ,States.
Lee first engages in a short discussion ofthe nation's historically pervasive pattern of discrimination against women. Sketching out instances
of early statutory and constitutional "relegation of women to a legal
status similar to that of slaves,"7 Lee notes that the very amendment
intended to guarantee equality for blacks was the first to interject the
word "male" into the Constitution. 8 He briefly touches on the initial
stages of nineteenth century legislative reform of the Draconian restraints on the ability of married women to own, control, and transfer
their property, to control their wages, to engage in employment outside
the home, and to own and control businesses. 9 In a later chapter, Lee
alludes to the continuing burdens imposed on women by these and numerous other statutory disabilitie,s.1O '
Lee's argument against the ERA begins to take shape as he shifts
his focus to constitutional history. He outlines the century of Supreme
Court repudiation of challenges to sex-based legislation, brought first
under the Fourteenth Amendment's privileges and immunities clause,
subsequently under its due process provision, and ultimately, under its
guarantee of equal protection. 11 Lee takes the position that the Court's
continuing refusal, until 1971, to afford constitutional recourse for denial of women's rights understandably sparked the current drive for a
constitutional amendment guaranteeing gender equality. One basic
premise of Lee's argument against the ERA in 1980, however, is that a
decade of decisions under the Court's newly adopted "intermediate
scrutiny" test for gender-based Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims has obviated the need for a constitutional amendment:
Over the intervening decade [since 1971] the Supreme Court has
developed a rather comprehensive body of case law dealing with
sex discrimination. The standard is neither rational baSIS nor
strict judicial scrutiny. It lies somewhere between the two. . . .
[I]t is beyond dispute that the big leap has already been
made. One of the proper roles for a constitutional amendment in
achieving reform is to make large changes, to reach new ground
previously unexplored. With respect to sex discrimination, a
change of that magnitude was needed in 1971. It had been
needed for decades and even centuries prior to 1971, but nothing
6. Id at 3.
7. R. LEE, supra note 3, at 4.
8. Id at 6.
9. Id at 5.
10. Id at 69-73.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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had happened. Today, the situation is very different. There is no
longer any question whether equality is constitutionally guaranteed to women. It is. 12
In support of this position, Lee carefully traces for his lay audience
the development and nature of an "intermediate scrutiny" test under
the Fourteenth Amendment for sex-based classifications. Prior to 1971,
he explains, challenges to gender-based classifications were doomed to
failure because of the Court's use of the traditional "rational basis"
standard of review in equal protection cases. 13 Lee explains how the
strong presumption of legitimacy accorded to legislative enactments
has been held to require persons challenging a legislative classification
to prove that the distinction is not rationally related to any conceivable
legitimate governmental objective, regardless of the state's actual basis
in fact for creating the classification. By contrast, in cases where the
nature of the classification is found to be "suspect," giving rise to the
presumption that its purpose is invidious, a "strict scrutiny" test is applied. This requires the government to bear the burden of proving that
the classification is necessary to the achievement of a compelling state
interest. As Lee correctly concludes, few classifications can be found
invalid under the former test, while virtually none will survive the
latter. 14
By 1971, the only "suspect" classifications subject to strict scrutiny
were those based on race,15 national origin,16 and alienage. 17 Lee observes with approval that only a plurality of the Supreme Court held in
1973 that gender-based classifications were suspect classifications subject to strict scrutiny.18 A majority of the Court has been marshalled
only in support of the curious hybrid standard appropriately dubbed
"intermediate scrutiny."19
Although the Court's decisions under this standard have been inconsistent and increasingly problematical, the test has generally been
held to place the burden on the government2° to prove that the sexbased classification is substantially related to achievement of an important governmental objective,21 which must transcend mere administra12. R. LEE, supra note 3, at 83.
13. Id. at 23-25.
14. Id. at 11-12.
15. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
16. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
17. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
18. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
19. R. LEE, supra note 3, at 23-31.
20. See, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 460 n.7 (1981); Personnel Adm'r v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979).
21. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976).
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tive ease and convenience.22 Further, the government must make a
persuasive factual showing both that the classification closely serves the
goal that was, in fact, the basis for the distinction,23 and that a genderneutral scheme would not serve the objective equally as well.24 Finally,
in scrutinizing classifications purportedly established to benefit women,
the Court has attempted to draw a distinction between those whose
purpose is "benign and compensatory," and therefore permissible, and
those founded on "archaic and overbroad'~ generalizations as to the
proper roles of women and men, and therefore constitutionally impermissible. 25 As discussed later in this review,26 the continuing vitality of
intermediate scrutiny, always a matter of doubt, has been seriously
threatened by two recent decisions upholding, respectively, the exclusion of women from draft registration27 and the exclusion of women
from criminal liability for statutory rape.2s
Lee's argum~nt against the ERA evolves from his comparison of
the theory that he believes to underlie intermediate scrutiny with the
results he foresees to be the outcome of judicial scrutiny under the
ERA. Purporting to rely on the Amendment's legislative history and
on general principles of constitutional law, Lee first explores the probable standard of review that would be adopted by the courts in applying the ERA. He thereafter predicts the ERA's effect on existing law in
the areas of compulsory military service, family law, education, and
employment. The primary focus of his concern, however, centers on
his conviction that the ERA will interfere with or invalidate governmental efforts to regulate sexual activityper se in three areas: criminal
sanctions for rape, laws limiting the rights of homosexuals, and laws or
customs barring maintenance of coeducational dormitories in state institutions of higher learning.29 He is also deeply troubled by the ERA's
implications for the future role of women in the draft and combat.30
Lee's argument against the ERA is based essentially on two seemingly contradictory propositions. On the one hand, he believes that the
ERA lacks either practical or symbolic value because women have already achieved their constitutional guarantee of equality through the
22. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. at 690; Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76
(1971).
23. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 200; Weinberger v. Weisenfe1d, 420 U.S. 636,
648 (1975).
24. See, e.g.. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. at 280.
25. See, e.g., id at 279; Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14 (1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard.
419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975).
26. See text accompanying notes 76-91 infra.
27. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
28. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
29. R. LEE, supra note 3, at 61-68.
30. Id at 55-59.
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intermediate scrutiny test.3l On the other hand, Lee also opposes the
Amendment on the ground that it will compel judges to enforce its
mandate of equality by invalidating existing classifications based on
sex, some of which he believes to be in the public interest and to enjoy
wide public support. He states, for example, "Several American experiences of recent years-most notably the exclusion of women from
draft registration in 1980-suggest that the national mood does not
favor radical changes in limiting government's flexibility to treat women and men differently.'>32 Later, he adds:
[O]ur national legislators-who usually are a fair bellwether of
national public opinion-. . . determined that even if compulsory military service were to be reestablished, it would not apply
to women. Under the ERA Congress would not have had that
choice. Even as to one of the few ERA consequences on which
everyone agrees, therefore, the 1980 draft experience shows that
our nation is not at a point of consensus.33
Regarding existing gender-based statutes regulating sexual conduct,
Lee similarly notes:
For some in our society, preservation of premarital virginity and
avoidance of extramarital sex relations are moral values of the
highest order. . . . Outmoded or not, they are important values
to the people that hold them. The inability of state legislatures to
use their best jud~ment in protecting against intrusion on such
values would dimInish individual dignity and liberty.34
He concludes that, "[T]he greater need is for flexibility in determining what kinds of distinctions between men and women are really
in our national interests, and what kinds are not."35
These excerpts aptly indicate Lee's position on the constitutional
rights of women. First, he believes that state-sanctioned distinctions
between men and women are and should be constitutionally permissible in an ill-defined group of cases in which a court finds the classification to be in the national interest. This finding turns in substantial part
on the court's perception of strong public support for the classification.
Second, the proper standard of review for gender-based classifications
must afford judges the flexibility to make these political judgments on a
case-by-case basis. Third, women are nonetheless guaranteed equality
under this standard because most of the sex-based laws that hurt them
will be invalidated. Fourth, the standard of review required by the
ERA wrongfully would compel judges to invalidate substantially all
gender-based legislation, the "good" as well as the "bad."
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 83-85.
at 31.
at 86.
at 63.
at 84.
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The most disturbing implication of Lee's argument is its ultimate
relegation of the constitutional rights of women to what Professor Lawrence Tribe calls "Gallup poll justice."36 Where women are concerned,
the result is judicial reinforcement of the supposedly antiquated notion
that a woman's place is in the home and a man's is in the world of
affairs.
Judicial deference to public opinion, in matters of sex discrimination, as in any other domain, is repugnant· to the fundamental principles of separation of powers and independence of the judiciary. In
condemning any "prescription for judicial submission to majoritarian
prejudice,"37 Professor Tribe maintains that, "Liberals and conservatives ought to agree that the one thing we do not need from our judges
is a good nose for what the public wants and a readiness to bend the
law-or break it-to keep judicial rulings in line with the majority
mood."38 Professor Tribe views with alarm the attack by Lee's colleague, Attorney General William French Smith, on the federal courts'
stubborn refusal to yield to "the groundswell of conservatism evidenced by the 1980 election."39
Judicial abdication to public sentiment is particularly insidious
when applied in sex discrimination cases where, as in race cases, the
same societal prejudices responsible for creation of the classification
may then be used to sustain its validity. Courts have summarily rejected the conceptually similar "customer preference" argument urged
by defendants in support of gender-based discrimination in employment cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.40
As stated by one court, "[I]t would be totally anomalous if we were to
allow the preferences and prejudices of the customers to determine
whether the sex discrimination was valid. Indeed, it was, to a large
extent, these very prejudices [Title III] was meant to overcome."41
Lee correctly concludes that the mandate of the ERA admits of no
such justification for gender-based distinctions. To the contrary, the
Amendment's premise was that laws that distinguish between people
on the basis of sex are illegal because they irrationally predicate governmental allocation of legal rights and obligations on the irrelevant
factor of gender, rather than on individual ability, need, or potential.42
36. Tribe, Courts should not be crilicizedfor ignoring public opinion, 2 CAL. LAW. 11
(1982).
37. fd. at 12.
38. fd. at 11.
39. fd. at 12.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-1 to -6, -8, -9, -13 to -17 (1964).
41. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir.), cerl. denied,404
U.S. 950 (1971).
42. S. REP. No. 92-689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-6, 11 (1972). For a detailed discussion of
the Amendment's theory, see Brown, Emerson, Falk, & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amend-
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Lee is also correct in assuming that courts, at a minimum, would have
applied strict scrutiny to sex-based classifications challenged under the
ERA.43 It has been argued that the Amendment's legislative history
additionally would have compelled strict scrutiny of facially neutral
laws that are shown to have a disparate impact on one sex-for example, laws stating that "persons with primary responsibility for children
under six need not apply."
Protection against indirect, covert or unconscious sex discrimination is essential to supplement the absolute ban on explicit sex
classifications of the Equal Rights Amendment. Past discrimination in education, training, economic status and other areas has
created differences which could readily be seized upon to perpetuate discrimination under the guise of functional classifications.
The courts will have to maintain a strict scrutiny of such classifications if the guarantees of the Amendment are to be effectively
secured.44
As Lee notes, courts might well have determined that the ERA's
clear language and legislative history warranted use of an "absolute
standard with qualifications.,,45 The authors of a law review article
that was read into the Congressional Record as part of the Amendment's legislative history assert: "The issue under the equal rights
amendment cannot be different but equal, reasonable or unreasonable
classification, suspect classification, fundamental interests, or the demands of administrative expediency. Equality of rights means that sex
is not a factor."46 This absolute bar on all gender-based classifications
would have been subject to two narrow qualifications. First, traditional
principles governing judicial balancing of constitutional rights would
have been invoked in cases involving the countervailing right of privacy. Thus, a state could have continued to protect the rights of the
individual to perform intimate .personal functions free of intrusion by
members of the opposite sex.4 Similar balancing has been accomplished by courts in cases posing conflicts between First Amendment
press rights and rights of criminal defendants under the Sixth
ment: A Constitutional Basisfor Equal Rightsfor Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Emerson]. See also B. BROWN, A. FREEDMAN, H. KATZ, & A. PRICE, WOMEN'S
RIGHTS AND THE LAW (1977) [hereinafter cited as B. BROWN].
43. R. LEE, supra note 3, at 41-42.
44. B. BRO)VN, supra note 42, at 17, citing Emerson, supra note 42, at 900. The authors
argue that although the Court has largely rejected this argument in race cases brought under
the Fourteenth Amendment, see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), most such laws
in sex cases arise from systematic exclusion of women from all but traditional domestic
roles, which would place them within the group of cases excluded from the Washington rule.
B. BROWN supra note 42, at 18.
45. R. LEE, supra note 3, at 47.
46. Emerson, supra note 42, at 892.
47. B. BROWN, supra note 42, at 15.
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Amendment.48
A second qualification would have held permissible gender-based
distinctions based on physical, presumably sexual, characteristics necessarily and uniquely found in one sex. These classifications would
have been subject to strict scrutiny and limited to designations such as
sperm donor or wet-nurse. Lastly, contrary to Lee's implication, it is
exceedingly unlikely that the ERA would have been held to bar gender-based affirmative action plans. Rather, courts would have looked
to the ERA's overriding purpose and upheld as consistent with that
purpose a true affirmative action program that met qualifications similar to those established for racial programs in United Steelworkers v.
Weber. 49
By its terms, the ERA would not have been self-enforcing, but
rather would have required citizens' groups, legislators, litigants, and
judges to implement its mandate. At the very least, the Amendment
would have served as a basis for judicial development of a coherent
approach to sex discrimination cases. It would also have stimulated
states to reexamine the hundreds, perhaps thousands, of gender-based
statutes that remain on their books and to reevaluate these laws' continued viability under the ERA. Most important, the ERA would serve in
the long run as a basis for affirmative legislation implementing its
promise of equal opportunity.
Curiously, Lee's most passionate arguments against the Amendment are not based on its potential for redistributing burdens and benefits, but rather on the threat he perceives it to pose to his own standards
of morality. Accordingly, he directs his arguments to the ERA's real or
imagined prospective impact on laws controlling sexual activity. With
respect to these prohibitions, Lee expresses the fear that courts will
somehow run amuck under the ERA, invalidating statutes willy-nilly,
with no regard for ordinary jurisprudential principles or public opinion. 50 His case for this scenario is weak. The judiciary is a notoriously
conservative institution, which historically has manifested few revolutionary tendencies in the area of sex discrimination. Indeed, the most
radical example that Lee can cite from all court decisions implementing
state ERA's, is a decision requiring a school district to allow two girls,
weighing, respectively, 170 and 212 pounds, to play on their high
school football team with the coach's enthusiastic support.51 In fact, as
Lee concedes, judicial experience with state ERA's demonstrates that
courts have sought to enforce these amendments in as uncontroversial a
48.
at 85.
49.
50.
51.

See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); R. LEE, supra note 3,
443 U.S. 193 (1979).
R. LEE, supra note 3, at 85-90.
Id at 52, citing Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975).
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manner as possible.52 It is true, however, that the ERA and its state
counterparts closely limit judicial discretion in an area where discretion
historically has been abused to deny vindication of individual rights.
In analyzing specific areas of the ERA's impact, Lee's tunnel vision on the issue of sexual morality leads to deceptively skewed and
often incorrect results. In the area of criminal justice, for example, he
ignores the Amendment's major potential impact on gender-based laws
that differentially define crimes, imp'ose penalties, and determine conditions of imprisonment for males and females. 53 Lee instead concentrates on two areas in which the ERA would have had little or no
meaningful impact. He first raises the specter of judicial abolition of
gender-specific rape laws, only to then acknowledge that the ERA, at
most, would have resulted in continuing punishment of vaginal rape
under a new, gender-neutrallabeP4 Lee makes a second emotionally
charged argument that the ERA would be held to abolish laws
criminalizing or otherwise burdening homosexual conduct. 55 This argument is untenable in light of the Amendment's legislative history to
the contrary56 and the judiciary's unequivocal rejection of this theory
in analogous contexts.57 Title VII's proscription of employment discrimination based on "sex," for example, uniformly has been held inapplicable to claims of discrimination based on sexual preference.58
Lee's analysis of the ERA's impact on public education betrays a
similarly misplaced focus. His discussion omits any mention of the
changes that would be effected in educationper se by the ERA, including those in curriculum, class instruction, and counseling. The need for
the Amendment in this area has become all the more evident with the
advent of Republican leadership in Congress and an Executive Branch
committed to strwping the federal statutes in this area of much of their
force and effect.5 Of more significance to Lee are those areas, incidental to education, in which the ERA might increase the propinquity of
52. R. LEE, supra note 3, at 51.
53. See generally B. BROWN, supra note 42, at 66-96.
54. R. LEE, supra note 3, at 62-64.
55. Id. at 64-65.
56. See Hearings on H.R.J. Res. 3.5-208 and Related Bills, and H.R. 916 and Related
Bills, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 402 (1971).
57. See, e.g., Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 326-27 (5th Cir. 1978) (Title
IV); Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974) (Washington ERA does not
invalidate a statute allowing only heterosexual marriages).
58. See, e.g., DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30 (9th Cir. 1979),
quoting Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977) ("Giving the
statute [Title VII] its plain meaning, this court concludes that Congress had only the traditional notions of 'sex' in mind"); see also EEOC Empl. Prac. Dec. 76-75 (CCH) 11 6495
(1976).
59. See, e.g., ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN COLLEGES PROJECT ON THE STATUS AND EDUCATION OF WOMEN, SUMMARY OF PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO TITLE IX: IMPACT ON
POST-SECONDARY INSTITUTIONS (1981); ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN COLLEGES PROJECT

1020

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 9:1011

male and female students. Chief among his areas of concern is the
Amendment's effect on coeducational student housing for those who
desire it, in those state universities that do not already provide it. 60 Although this narrow issue presents for Lee a conflict with his own
strongly held, private standards of morality, it is not clear why his personal morals should serve as a basis for denying college students the
right to live in cheap, coeducational state housing. Nor can this issue
possibly assume the importance that Lee clearly accords it.
Lee's lopsided approach is equally apparent in his brief discussion
of employment. His focus .is on the ERA's admittedly nominal effect
on sex-based state ~'protective" laws, which, he concedes, already have
been legally invalidated by federal statute. 61 Moreover, most courts
that have applied state ERA's to these largely harmful statutes have
utilized traditional rules of legislative interpretation and construction,
striking down those that unreasonably burden one sex and, when consistent with legislative history, rendering "gender-neutral" a statute
that confers substantial benefits to one sex.62
Ironically, Lee neglects to address the one issue of sexual segregation that is of paramount importance: the continuing segregation of
women into "women's jobs" of low remuneration and limited opportunities for advancement. In 1973, for example, over sixty percent of all
working women were employed as clerical workers, service workers, or
teachers.63 In 1977, women, who then comprised almost forty percent
of the nation's full-time work force, earned only fifty-nine cents for
every dollar earned by men, with female college graduates earning less
than men who had failed to complete the ninth grade. 64
Both as a symbol of national commitment to equality for women
and as a practical tool for enforcement of equal opportunity in public
employment, the ERA would have played a major role in changing
these statistics. Federal, state, and local governments together constitute by far the largest employer in the nation, and one of the most discriminatory. Seventy-eight percent of all federally employed women,
for example, are concentrated in jobs rated GS-8 or below, on a scale
from GS-l to GS-16, while seventy-three percent of all men are employed at GS-8 or higher.65 Continued wide use of sex-differentiated
ON THE STATUS AND EDUCATION OF WOMEN, ON CAMPUS WITH WOMEN 2-3 (No. 30
Spring 1981).
60. R. LEE, supra note 3, at 65-68.
61. Id at 75-78.
62. B. BROWN, supra note 42, at 29.
63. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, WOMEN'S BuREAU 1975 HANDBOOK ON WOMEN WORKERS 88 (1975).
64. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, WOMEN'S BUREAU, THE EARNINGS GAP BETWEEN WOMEN AND MEN 2, 4 (1979).
65. NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, ERA AND EMPLOYED WOMEN, (1981).
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job titles, neutral job requirements that have a disparate impact on women, and sex-based benefit plans, would all be vulnerable to attack
under the Amendment.66
It is true that the ERA would have merely supplemented existing
state and federal fair employment and equal pay statutes. As a
prominent figure in the Reagan administration, however, Lee would
hardly have the temerity to argue that women should rest secure in the
continuing vitality of laws currently on the President's chopping
block.67 In fact, it is the very "correctability" of such legislation that
commends to Lee the le~islative rather than the constitutional approach to these problems. 8
Consonant with this view is Lee's preference for the "flexibility" of
the intermediate constitutional scrutiny test in sex cases. Lee finds
comfort in what he perceives to be its neutral approach to governmental enactments and its wide leeway for exercise of judicial discretion.69
But, when the test has been applied in accordance with its own basic
requirements, his perceptions are inaccurate. The test actually imposes
an exceptionally heavy burden on the government to establish the classification's actual basis to be an important, nonstereotypical objective
for which the gender-based distinction is carefully tailored.70 The
Court's adherence to these well established principles has resulted in its
invalidation of numerous federal and state gender-based statutes, many
of which were enacted in the exercise of governmental powers traditionally accorded judicial deference. These include military7I and social security statutes,72 regulation of alcoholic beverages,73 and family
lawenactments.74
The Court has misapplied intermediate scrutiny, however, in cases
where the state's ostensible objective was the "benign" purpose of
"compensating" women for past and ongoing discrimination that itself
is unaffected by the decision. 75 The Court thus has failed to distinguish
between true affirmative action, the goal of which is to change and
66. See C. SAMUELS, THE FORGO'ITEN FIVE MILLION: WOMEN IN PUBLIC. EMPLOY(1975).
67. See, e.g., Lublin, Reagan's Advisors Accuse the EEOC of "Racism," Suggest Big Cutback, Wall St. J., Jan. 26, 1981, at 21, col. 4.
68. R. LEE, supra note 3, at 86.
69. It!. at 31.
70. See notes 20-25 and accompanying text supra.
71. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
72. See, e.g., Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. 636 (1975).
73. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
74. See, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268
(1979).
75. See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S.
498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
MENT

1022

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 9:1011

broaden the roles of women, and "compensation," which serves as a
stopgap palliative, merely reinforcing existing discriminatory role patterns. Such measures are never "benign." Moreover, these decisions
reflect the Court's dangerous tendency in difficult cases to revert to the
kind of judicial paternalism that has ill-served women for over a
century.
Never has this been as painfully clear as in two of the Court's
opinions of the 1980-81 term, which together distort the intermediate
scrutiny test beyond recognition. In upholding gender-based draft registration inRostker v. Goldberg76 and statutory rape laws in Michael M
v. Superior Court,77 Justice Rehnquist and the Court's majority may
well be signaling a dramatic retreat from the gains of the past decade.
The implicit rationale of these decisions is, in essence, no different from
that employed in 1873 by Justice Bradley in his now infamous concurring opinion in Bradwell v. Illinois /8 which denied women the right to
practice law because:
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil
life . . . .

The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill
the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law
of the Creator. And the rules of civil society must be adapted to
the general constitution of things, and cannot be based upon exceptional cases.79
A similar rationale underlies the Court's 1908 decision in Muller v. Oregon,80 in which women were found to be in need of "protection" in the
workplace because:
Even though all restrictions on political, personal and contractual
rights were taken away . . . it would still be true that she is so
constituted that she will look to [man] for protection, that her
physical structure and a proper discharge of her maternal functions-having in view not merely her own health, but the wellbeing of the race-justify legislation to protect her from the greed
as well as the passion of men. 81
The Court's 1980-81 opinions, of course, superficially take a different tack. In aid of upholding Congress' decision to exclude women
from draft registration, despite unanimous support by top military
leadership for their inclusion, Justice Rehnquist in Rostker 82 finds
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

453 U.S. 57 (1981).
450 U.S. 464 (1981).
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
Id. at 141.
208 U.S. 412 (1908).
Id. at 422.
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. at 81.
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vague assertions of the hitherto impermissable goal of administrative
convenience to justify the exclusion. He acknowledges with approval
the Senate Report's finding that "[t]he principle that women should not
intentionally and routinely engage in combat is fundamental, and enjoys wide support among our people."83
Most disturbing in the Court's quest for a legal rationalization is
its bootstrap argument that the exclusion of women from registration is
justified by the constitutionally suspect, yet unexamined, exclusion of
women from combat by federal statute and custom. 84 The Court has
twice before engaged in this specious reasoning. In Schlesinger v. Rallard,85 it upheld a statute allowing female Navy officers a longer period
than males in which to achieve promotion, on the ground that this compensated women in part for the pervasive pattern of sex-based military
regulations that otherwise burdened their advancement. Similarly, in
Parham v. Hughes,86 the Court upheld a law denying the father, but
not the mother, of an illegitimate child the right to sue for the child's
wrongful death unless he had legitimated the child. Again the Court
reasoned that this gender-based statute was valid in light of another,
constitutionall~ unexamined, state law allowing fathers alone to legitimate children. 7 As the third and most damaging instance in which the
Court has engaged in this reasoning, Rostker bodes ill for future efforts
to dismantle pervasive systems of discrimination.
While Rostker might optimistically be dismissed as a matter of
pure politics, the Court's decision in Michael M. v. Superior Court,88
upholding California's statutory rape law, must be seen as a clear instance of retreat to rational basis scrutiny, or worse. In Michael M. , the
Court upheld a statute imposing criminal penalties on men, but not
women, who engage in intercourse with a member of the opposite sex
who is under eighteen years of age and not their spouse. The Court's
plurality opinion first accepts and relies on the state's patently post hoc
justification for the statute as a means of deterring teenage pregnancy,
even though the state had twice before defended the statute on the
grounds that it protected female virtue and chastity.89 In addition, despite the fact that the state was unable to make any factual showing
that the male-only criminal penalty closely served, or indeed, served at
all, the goal of pregnancy prevention, the Court nevertheless upheld the
statute on the bare assertion that it "protects women from sexual inter83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
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course at an age when those consequences are particularly severe."90
Thus, as in Muller, decided 75 years earlier, woman's "physical structure" presumptively justifies "legislation to protect her from the . . .
passion of men."91
The darker side of this "protection" emerges in some of the
Court's employment decisions. In Dothard v. Rawlinson,92 for example,
women were "protected" from the possibility of being raped while employed as guards in a maximum security prison by the simple expedient
of excluding them from that employment altogether. Pregnant working
women likewise found little protection in the Court's reasoning in
Geduldig v. Aiello ,93 which upheld their exclusion from an otherwise
comprehensive program of disability insurance coverage. Holding that
pregnancy discrimination is not "sex" discrimination, the Court stated:
"The lack of identity between [pregnancy] and gender as such under
this insurance program becomes clear upon the most cursory analysis.
The program divides potential recipients into two groups-pregnant
women and nonpregnant persons."94
Michael M. and Rostker, particularly when read together with the
Court's third sex case of the term, Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 95 demonstrate
the ultimate plasticity of intermediate scrutiny. In Kirchberg, Justice
Marshall, writing for the majority, strictly applied the test to strike
down an already superseded state law giving husbands the unilateral
right to dispose of jointly owned community property without the
wife's consent. This trilogy represents a result Rex Lee professes to
respect and expect under the intermediate scrutiny test. It serves to
grant women "equality" when politically feasible to do so, and to withhold equality in controversial areas of fundamental importance. In
protecting young women from the most onerous of civic obligations,
for example, the Court in Rostker confirms the second class citizenship
of all women. Another majority of the Court noted 130 years earlier in
Dred Scott v. Sandford that a black in 1857 could not serve in the Army
because "[h]e forms no part of the sovereignty of the State, and is not,
therefore, called on to uphold and defend it."96
The Court's recent decisions highlight the tragedy of the ERA's
defeat. Never was a symbol of the nation's commitment to women's
equality more sorely needed than it is now, when the Congress is considering constitutional amendments to ban abortion,97 federallegisla90.
91.
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tion to cut aid to school districts whose textbooks depict women in
nontraditional roles,98 and other federal action intended to destroy the
effectiveness of statutes protecting women's rights to equal educational
opportunity.99
As a practical matter, the Amendment would have had no effect
on sexual morality, but it would have had an enormous impact on public morality. As noted in the ERA's legislative history:
[T]he basic principle of the ERA derives from two fundamental
judgments inherent in the decision to eliminate discrimination
against women from our legal system. First, the Amendment embodies the moral judgment that women as a group may no longer
be relegated to an inferior position in our society. . . . Second
... (c)lassification bd' sex ... negates all our values of individual self-fulfillment. 10
In the absence of a federal amendment, efforts will be focused on
passage of state ERA's, continuing legislative reform, and persistent
pressure on the courts to construe strictly the requirements of intermediate scrutiny. 101 Rex Lee's book should be of guidance to those seeking to understand the deeply held beliefs and fears of many of those
who most strenuously opposed the ERA. With knowledge may come
the power to convince.
lJrucilla Stender Ramey*

98. See, e.g., S. 1378-H.R. 395, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (known as the "Family
Protection Act").
99. See note 59 supra.
100. Emerson, supra note 42, at 890.
101. After this book review had gone to press, the Court held, by a bare 5-4 majority,
that a state's maintenance of an all-female nursing school constituted a violation of Fourteenth Amendment equal protection guarantees. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's ringing
endorsement and rigorous application of the intermediate scrutiny test may signal a promising move back to the test's fundamental tenets and vitality. Mississippi Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 102 S. Ct. 3331 (1982).
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